MKCMUN

Security Council

STATE MEMBERS

Representatives to the Security Council should note that the agenda provided is only provisional. The Security Council may discuss any international peace and security issue brought before it. For this reason, Representatives must have a broad base of knowledge on current events in the international community. Also, the overviews provided below are only current through the publication of this handbook. Some of the topics listed below may change significantly before the Conference, and Representatives should be familiar with the up-to-date situations. Periodicals are one of the best recommended sources available for day-to-day updates. These include among others: New York Times,UN Chronicle, Christian Science Monitor, Foreign Policy, The Economist and Keesing's Record of World Events. Also, the UN Foundation's on-line daily newsletter, the UN Wire, is an excellent resource for timely information. Whenever possible, we also recommend that Representatives familiarize themselves with the most recent report(s) published by the Secretary-General on each situation. These can be found on the UN home page under the Security Council documents section. Please note that the bibliographies for these topics focus primarily on UN sources, as news sources will by definition be dated by the time of the Conference. Representatives may nonetheless wish to consult earlier news sources for general background on the various situations.

Initial background research is provided below for each region, with one or two topics receiving more in-depth analysis. Other topics are also listed with brief synopses. Security Council representatives are neither limited to the main topics discussed or any of the topics listed. Should world events move in a different direction from the topics provided in this handbook, the Security Council is welcome to discuss any peace and security matter which it desires.

Please note that resolutions should be written on the sub-topics of each regional area: i.e., resolutions would not be written about "the Middle East," but rather about "The Situation in Iraq" or similar sub-topics within the region.

BACKGROUND RESEARCH  

Security Council

Information in this section based on recommended reading found at:

The Security Aspects of the United Nations Charter. United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. http://www.una-uk.org/UN&C/charter.html.

The UN Charter, constituted in San Francisco in 1945, performs three principal functions:

• it establishes the UN's main structures and how they work together;
• it lays down the guiding principles which form a legal and moral basis for the Organization's actions;
• and it outlines behavioral norms between states.

Article 24(1) of the Charter provides the Security Council with the 'primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security' [see Security Council Briefing]. Moreover, Article 2(4) of the Charter asserts that all Members of the UN 'shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state'.

Thus, military aggression against individual countries by UN Member States is effectively forbidden, without the authorization of the Security Council, except in cases of self-defense.

Chapters VI and VII

The sections of the Charter most relevant to the UN's security function are Chapters VI and VII.

Chapter VI

Chapter VI provides the Security Council with the authority to try to uphold the peaceful resolution of disputes. According to Article 33 (1), the means to realize this objective include: 'negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement, [and] resort to regional agencies or arrangements'.

Chapter VII

Chapter VII provides for the use of coercive force to counter threats and breaches of international peace and security, as well as acts of aggression, in the form of administering economic and/or military sanctions or authorizing collective military action.

Article 51

Article 51 of the Charter allows for individual or collective self-defense, without the prior consent of the Security Council, until the Council has taken the necessary steps to ensure the maintenance of world peace. Measures taken by Member States under Article 51 must be reported immediately to the Council.

Article 51 has regularly and controversially been cited by states to justify security action in pursuit of primarily national interests without having to refer to the Security Council. For instance, in 1998, the United States quoted Article 51 in reference to its bombing of a chemical plant in Khartoum which it suspected of being involved in terrorist activities against America.

Problems Inherent in the Charter

Contradictions in the Charter have hampered the UN's ability to realize its security objectives.

The Proliferation of Internal Conflicts

The creators of the UN assumed that states were generally internally stable and would operate primarily through their governments, and so armed conflicts would occur between opposing national armies. In fact, however, the post-World War II era has witnessed an increasing proliferation of internal conflicts, often involving large numbers of non-sate actors. Indeed, of the 27 major armed conflicts in 1999, only two took place between states1. As a result, many of the conflicts after World War II could not be classified as the illegal invasion of one state by another, and so threatened to fall outside the UN's jurisdiction.

Sovereignty vs. Human Rights

Perhaps the greatest contradiction in the UN Charter is that between supporting individual human rights and the right to state sovereignty and non-interference. Social, economic and human rights issues are emphasized in Articles 55-6, under whose terms all Member States pledge to take joint and separate action to promote (amongst other things): 'universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all'. However, these ideals can conflict the terms of Article 2(7), which restricts the UN from intervening: 'in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state'.

The increasing trend towards internal conflict has emphasized this contrast, particularly as international intervention is often undertaken in support of a humanitarian mandate. The contrast was evident in the opposition of Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to intervention by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Kosovo in March 1999 on the grounds that Kosovo was part of Yugoslav sovereign territory.

Regional Action

The NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia also highlighted problems relating to security action undertaken by regional groups. In particular, concern centered around the fact that the Security Council had not given explicit authorization for NATO's actions. While Article 52(1) of Chapter VIII of the Charter allows action by regional bodies as long as it is consistent with the UN's principles, Article 53 (1) declares that 'no enforcement action shall be taken' by regional bodies 'without the authorization of the Security Council'. 

I. Role of the Security Council in War Prevention

Information in this section based on recommended reading found at:

Introduction. United Nations. http://www0.un.org/Depts/dpa/prev_dip/fr_prev_dip_introduction_2.htm

Conflict prevention is meant to prevent human suffering and act as an alternative to costly politico-military operations to resolve conflicts after they have broken out. Although preventive diplomacy is a well-tried means of preventing conflict, and is still the primary political measure for preventing and resolving conflicts, the United Nations' experience in recent years has shown that there are several other forms of action that can have a useful preventive effect, including: preventive deployment; preventive disarmament; humanitarian action; and peace-building undertaken in preventive context. These can involve, with the consent of the Government or Governments concerned, a wide range of actions in the fields of good governance, human rights and economic and social development. For this reason, the Secretary-General has used the concept of preventive action rather than "preventive diplomacy" when addressing the root causes of conflict.

Structural prevention refers to such activities before the conflict. As experience demonstrates, poverty, socio-economic inequalities, endemic underdevelopment, weak or non-existent institutions, the absence of good governance and gross human rights violations can provide the conditions that lead to conflict. Measures which are taken to address the broad range of long-term political, institutional and development activities, belong to structural prevention and support national efforts in addressing the root causes of potential conflict situations.

Peacemaking (or conflict resolution) refers to the use of diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate a peaceful settlement of their dispute. The United Nations can usually play a role only if the parties to the dispute agree to it. Peacemaking thus excludes the use of force against one of the parties to enforce an end to hostilities, an activity that in United Nations parlance is referred to as "peace enforcement."

Peace-building refers to activities aimed at assisting nations to cultivate the promotion of peace before, during and after conflict. Peace-building is most often used very broadly but sometimes to refer to post-conflict situations only. In the broadest sense, peace-building is aimed at preventing the outbreak, the recurrence or continuation of armed conflict and therefore encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and human rights programs and mechanisms. This requires short and long-term actions tailored to address the particular needs of societies sliding into conflict or emerging from it.

The Secretary-General has made conflict prevention the cornerstone in his quest to promote a more peaceful, equitable and prosperous world. Indeed, he has declared on numerous occasions that for the United Nations there is no higher goal, no deeper commitment and no greater ambition than preventing armed conflict. In June 2001, he submitted his first report on the Prevention of Armed Conflict (A/55/985-S/2001/574, A/55/985/Corr.1-S/2001/574/Corr.1) to both the General Assembly and the Security Council for their consideration after the Security Council had requested such a report in its Presidential Statement of S/PRST/2000/25 dated 20 July 2000. In this report, he presents a compelling rationale for the proposition that conflict prevention is better than cure.

The report reviews the progress that has been achieved in developing the conflict prevention capacity of the United Nations, and presents 29 specific recommendations on how the efforts of the United Nations system in this field could be further enhanced. The specific contributions that can be made by the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretary- General are explored, as is the cooperation between the United Nations and outside actors, such as regional organizations, NGOs, civil society and the business community. The report also examines how the United Nations family of departments, programs, offices and agencies interact in the furtherance of the prevention of armed conflict.

The report stresses that conflict prevention lies at the heart of the mandate of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security, and that a general consensus is emerging among Member States that comprehensive and coherent conflict prevention strategies offer the greatest potential for promoting lasting peace and creating an enabling environment for sustainable development. The report emphasizes that "the imperative for effective conflict prevention goes beyond creating a culture, establishing mechanisms or summoning political will. The United Nations also has a moral responsibility to ensure that genocides such as that perpetrated in Rwanda are prevented from ever happening again. "The Secretary-General therefore concludes that: "The time has come to translate the rhetoric of conflict prevention into concrete action."

Following the issuance of the report the Security Council held a public debate on the report on 21 June, and later, on 30 August 2001, it adopted a very substantial resolution 1366 (2001) (S/RES/1366(2001)) welcoming most of the recommendations addressed to it. This was followed by a General Assembly debate on the matter and the report was almost universally welcomed and its recommendations supported. A procedural General Assembly resolution 55/281(A/RES/55/281) was adopted on 1 August 2001 calling upon "all relevant organs, organizations and bodies of the United Nations system to consider the recommendations addressed to them and to inform the General Assembly, preferably during its fifty-sixth session, of their views in this regard." Another procedural resolution to continue consideration of the report of the Secretary-General on the prevention of armed conflict was subsequently passed in September 2002 (A/RES/56/512 dated 13 September 2002).

Earlier, the Secretary-General had submitted two major reports which also discussed conflict prevention; in 1992, "An Agenda for Peace" (A/47/277 and S/24111 dated 17 June 1992) and in 1995 the "Supplement to an Agenda for Peace" (A/50/60 and S/1995/1 dated 3 January 1995). The General Assembly passed resolutions based on these reports (A/47/120 A and B dated 18 December 1992 and 20 September 1993 respectively and A/RES/51/242 of 15 September 1997).

II. Peacekeeping

Information in this section based on recommended reading found at:

United Nations Peacekeeping. United Nations Association of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. http://www.una-uk.org/UN&C/Peacekeeping.html.

Peacekeeping operations are perhaps the most public face of the UN's work and, arguably, best reflect its primary function as the principal institution for the maintenance of world peace. In An Agenda for Peace (1992), former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali defined peacekeeping as:

The deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.

Initially, peacekeeping had not been foreseen as a tool for the maintenance of world peace and so was not included in the UN Charter. Indeed, peacekeeping was born largely out of necessity, emanating from the UN's failure to establish its own military capability and hence assume its intended collective security role, as well as from the political restrictions imposed by the onset of the Cold War.

Traditional Peacekeeping

One of the main incentives behind the development of UN peacekeeping was the Cold War political climate in which it evolved. During the Cold War era, the superpowers had an interest in bringing to an end proxy wars before they were themselves dragged into direct confrontation. Thus, peacekeeping tended to be limited to preserving an agreed truce between opposing national armed forces while alternative mechanisms were used to address a conflict's underlying issues.

The UN Truce Supervision Organization, established in 1948 in response to the 1940 Arab-Israeli war, is generally perceived as the first UN peacekeeping operation. However, the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF I), deployed in response to the Suez crisis in 1956 was the first peacekeeping operation referred to as such and it was this mission that established fundamental peacekeeping guidelines which have remained relevant today.

As part of his report to the Security Council concerning UNEF's establishment, the then UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld, widely perceived as the father of UN peacekeeping, defined the principles of peacekeeping as requiring that:

• a mission must have the authorization of the Security Council;
• UN involvement in a conflict requires the consent of the parties to that conflict;
• a mission must maintain operational neutrality and so must not influence the political balance of power between warring parties;
• peacekeepers should not use coercive force, except in self-defense;
• and personnel for an operation must be recruited voluntarily from UN member states, excluding from the Permanent Five members of the Security Council and states with interests in the conflict.

Traditional peacekeeping was often a highly effective means of achieving the goals it was designed for. For instance, UNEF I certainly helped to defuse the Suez crisis. However, its limited nature has also meant that traditional peacekeeping is not applicable to many of today's armed conflicts, in particular internal conflicts where the consent of the parties cannot be guaranteed.

Multidimensional Peacekeeping

In the late 1980s, the scope, size and number of UN peacekeeping operations dramatically increased: of the 49 UN operations deployed between 1948 and 1998, 36 came after 1988.

The new era of international co-operation that resulted from the end of the Cold War encouraged agreement in the Security Council over the sanctioning of collective security action. Thus, the UN was now prepared to authorize peacekeeping operations in a broader set of circumstances, including in internal crises where consent is less well defined. Also, there was wider scope as to the functions that new operations could perform.

The resulting multidimensional peacekeeping operations can incorporate elements of peace-making, peace-building, and preventive diplomacy. The broader mandates of multidimensional operations can involve a very wide variety of tasks, including: electoral support; humanitarian assistance; observation, and/or verification of cease-fire arrangements; preventative deployments; the demobilization of forces; and development initiatives.

The first multifunctional operation established at the end of the Cold War was the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), deployed to Namibia in February 1989. Its mandate was essentially political, to create the conditions for free and fair elections in the country. It was the first mission to prepare a nation for elections and independence, clearly moving beyond traditional bounds of peacekeeping. Ultimately, three hundred and fifty-eight UNTAG-supervised polling stations were set up and over 97% of the registered voter population participated in the elections.

Multinational Forces

Under certain circumstances, the Security Council can sanction Multinational Forces (MNFs) to carry out peacekeeping tasks. Such forces are not UN operations, but do act under the authority of the Security Council. For instance, in response to violence following the August 1999 referendum granting independence to East Timor, the Security Council authorized the deployment of an Australian-led force, INTERFET, to help restore stability to the region.

The advantages of such types of operation relate primarily to speed of deployment. MNFs avoid the lengthy financial wrangling involved in the establishment of a UN mission, as the contributing countries themselves initially cover the costs. Moreover, the fact that a single country takes on the leadership role speeds up the command and control structure of the force.

Disadvantages, however, include the fact that any state that is prepared to lead such an operation is likely to have a political interest in doing so, and so is also likely to be perceived as biased by one or more parties to the dispute. For instance, Indonesia initially objected to Australian involvement in East Timor. Furthermore, leading states are unlikely to be prepared to bear the financial and other burdens involved in peacekeeping for very long, as evidenced by the rapid replacement of INTERFET with a full fledged UN operation, UNTAET. 

Enforcement and Peacekeeping

In extreme circumstances, the Security Council can authorize, under Chapter VII of the Charter, "such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security". The most obvious demonstration of such enforcement action was the allied response to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. This was the first time an enforcement operation had been undertaken since the Korean crisis in 1950.

Moreover, the fulfillment of increasingly complex peacekeeping functions demanded of peace operations deployed in the more fluid environments of internal conflicts has periodically led to the use or threat of force in pursuit of a peacekeeping operation's mandate. For instance, force has been authorized to protect humanitarian aid convoys or civilian populations. However, in Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (1995), Boutros-Ghali warned that:

the logic of peacekeeping flows from political and military premises that are quite distinct from those of enforcement ... to blur the distinction between the two can undermine the viability of the peacekeeping operation and its personnel.

Contraction in UN Peacekeeping

The risks involved in incorporating enforcement into peacekeeping operations were clearly demonstrated in the disastrous consequences of UN involvement the deepening crisis in Somalia in the early 1990s.

In May 1993, the second UN peace operation, UNOSOM II, was given the broad and very ambitious mandate of rebuilding the state of Somalia within a still very violent environment. One of its primary tasks was to disarm all warring factions. This was met with widespread resistance, particularly from faction leader Farah Aideed, which culminated in the public deaths of eighteen American troops serving with the operation.

The US subsequently announced the withdrawal of all US troops from Somalia, leading to the winding down of the entire mission a year later, as the war continued unabated. Serious debate was raised over the future breadth of peacekeeping operations, with divisions over whether it should strictly return to its traditional functions or should enhance its capacity to handle the more ambitious multifunctional mandates.

The ultimate result of events in Somalia was a general disengagement by the UN from its peacekeeping responsibilities, the most prominent example of which was the Organization's failure to respond to genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Ultimately, the total deployment of UN military and civilian personnel fell from its 1993 peak of more than 80,000 personnel to approximately 14,000 in 1998.

Renaissance

The end of the 1990s saw a limited renaissance in UN peacekeeping activities, however. Since June 1999, the Security Council has deployed missions in East Timor, Eritrea/Ethiopia, Sierra Leone and Kosovo, although the security aspects of the Kosovo operation remain the responsibility of NATO. The deployment of these missions has meant that, as of January 2001, the number of military and civilian police personnel serving in UN peacekeeping operations stood at 37,719. However, the well-documented problems still being experienced by UN peace operations, most notably in Sierra Leone, demonstrate how much work still needs to be done in this area.

Indeed, in March 2000, Kofi Annan set up a Panel on UN Peace Operations, composed of individuals experienced in various aspects of conflict prevention, peace-making peacekeeping and peace-building, to assess the strengths and shortcomings of the UN's existing system and to make recommendations for change. The panel focused not only on politics and strategy but also on operational and organizational areas of need and its report (known as the Brahimi report) was released in late August, 2000. The report was extremely comprehensive and looked in detail at many aspects of UN peace operations. It remains to be seen which of the Brahimi recommendations are implemented and if these, in turn, can have a positive impact on the UN's peacekeeping capability.

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• What is the proper role of the international community in Iraq?2007 Issues at AMUN • Page 9 The Security Council